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AN EXERCISE IN CONTRACT DAMAGES: CITY OF
MEMPHIS v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY
IAN R. MACNEIL *
When the court tangled with difficult problems of contract
damages in City of Memphis v. Ford Motor Co., 1
 certain salutary rules
of damages emerged somewhat the worse for wear. Although the case
itself can in no sense be considered a landmark in the law, never-
theless, certain aspects, because they are found only in the record and
thus generally unavailable in the future to the profession, require
comment.
For many years Ford had an assembly plant in Memphis in which
it used substantial amounts of electricity, supplied by Memphis Light,
Gas and Water Division, a branch of the city government engaged in
the electric utility business.' In 1955 Memphis hired consulting en-
gineers to consider the feasibility of building a steam generating plant.
Memphis at that time had no generating capacity, purchasing all of
its energy. Early in 1956 Memphis awarded contracts for the building
of three 250,000 KW' units. According to the President of the Di-
vision this was one of the largest steam generating plants ever to
be built at one time.' By November 19, 1956 Memphis had made
commitments for over $45,000,000. Less than a month later it issued
$163,000,000 in bonds to finance the generating plant and related
facilities.
On November 19, 1956 Ford entered a contract with Memphis,
under the terms of which Memphis agreed to supply and Ford agreed
to buy electrical energy to be used for the operation of Ford's plant.
The life of the contract was five years from the effective date, Decem-
ber 1, 1956. Under the terms of the contract "The minimum monthly
bill for demand and energy . . . shall in no case be less then $1.20 per
* Assoc. Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1950, Univ. of Vermont; LL.B.
1955, Harvard Law School.
1 304 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1962).
2 This statement of facts is from the appendices filed in the Court of Appeals. Ref-
erence is made to particular pages only when the fact referred to was or might be subject
to substantial controversy.
a A brief explanation of some of the terms and abbreviations used may be
helpful. KW (kilowatt) is a measure of the rate of delivery of electric energy. Demand,
which is measured in KW, is the rate at which the customer calls for energy. The max-
imum rate to which the customer has a contract right is the contract demand. KWH
(kilowatt hours) is the total amount of energy delivered during any given period.
4 For
 comparison: The Grand Coulee hydroelectric plant has a capacity of 1,974,000
KW; Hoover hydroelectric plant has a capacity of 1,249,800 KW. The World Almanac
and Book of Facts, 1962, p. 220.
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kilowatt, times the highest demand established during the preceding
twelve months or contract demand, whichever is greater." Contract
demand was 5300 KW. Another clause provided a surcharge of fifteen
per cent on demand and energy charges and on minimum bills. In
addition the contract contained the following provision:
In the event of cancellation of this agreement by Division for
any breach or default on the part of Customer, ... there shall
immediately become due and payable to Division as liqui-
dated damages, and not as a penalty, on account of the
`special investment* of Division made for the benefit of
Customer, a further amount equal to the sum of the minimum
amounts or minimum monthly bills computed for the entire
period of the unexpired term thereof. (Footnote added.)
In the middle of January 1959 Ford sold its plant, and moved out of
Memphis. The Division thereupon sent Ford a bill of $3,413.22 for the
first part of January and for $252,576.78, the amount of the minimum
charge for the remaining thirty-four and one-half months of the con-
tract.' Ford paid the bill for the service rendered during the first part
of January, but refused to pay any of the balance. The Division sued
Ford in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee where it secured judgment for $252,576.78 with interest
from the date of the filing of the complaint. In the Court of Appeals
Ford argued, among other things,' that the acceleration clause was a
penalty. However, the court rejected Ford's arguments and affirmed the
judgment below.
Two aspects of the case deserve particular consideration: (1)
whether the acceleration clause was valid and (2) what the measure
of damages would be in a case like this in the absence of the
acceleration clause. Since the answer to the first question depends in
part on the second, they will be considered in reverse order.
Measure of damages in absence of acceleration clause. One of the
fundamental assumptions of contract law is that generally a party to
5 The meaning of the words "special investment" which were also used elsewhere
in the agreement were complicated in the case by facts which need not concern us in
analyzing the problems raised here.
6 It is interesting to note that the record is lacking in evidence that there had at this
point been any clear repudiation by Ford which would justify the acceleration of the
subsequent bills. The Division did, however, know informally (Appellant's Appendix,
47a) what Ford's position was, and it was not unreasonable for it to assume that Ford
would repudiate the contract, as Ford in fact did.
7 Ford's primary position was that the contract was a requirements contract and
that when its need for electricity terminated it was no longer obligated by the minimum
bill provision. However, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's findings
that, in effect, "the contract was not a 'requirements contract' but was a contract for
a five-year term, under which Ford was obligated to pay the minimum monthly bills
specified in the contract during that period. .. ." 304 F.2d at 848.
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a contract injured by breach is entitled to damages sufficient to put
him in the position that he would have been in if the performance
had been rendered as promised. 8 In short he receives protection of
what has been called the expectation interest.' Had Ford not breached
the contract Memphis would have been entitled to receive $7,314
the middle of each month from February 1959 through December
1961, for service during the months of January 1959 through Novem-
ber 1961. Under the decision in this case Memphis received judgment
for the total of those amounts, less the $3,413.22 already received
for service in January. Such an award in two ways puts Memphis
in a better position than it would have been in if the contract had
been performed. First, Memphis would have had expenses which it
was saved by the breach. These savings were not deducted from its
recovery. Second, under the contract Memphis would have received
payment of the minimum bills only in installments and not in a lump
sum. The judgment does not transform those installments into their
present value at the time of judgment.
Expenses saved. The contract incorporated a rate schedule which
provided for a monthly demand charge' of one dollar per KW of
demand and an energy charge" of 2.75 mills per KWH, plus a fifteen
per cent surcharge on each. 12 If Ford had fully performed its contract
obligations it would have paid Memphis $7,314 per month through
the end of November 1961, the "minimum monthly bill for demand
8 The purposes underlying this assumption are explored in the classic article, Fuller
& Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52, 373 (1936-1937).
See also Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 175, 187 (1954). An even
more basic principle is that plaintiff can recover only compensation for losses. McCormick,
Damages § 81 (1935). Thus the plaintiff should recover no more than the amount neces-
sary to place him in the same position that he would have been in, had there been no
breach, unless, of course, he can show some other losses to be compensated. A possible
exception even to the compensation principle is the notion that one who breaches may
be deprived of his enrichment even though plaintiff's losses of any kind are less than
defendant's enrichment. See Dawson, supra, especially 185-89.
0 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 54.
10 As the rate schedule implies, a demand charge is a charge determined by the
maximum rate of delivery of energy to which the customer is entitled during a specified
period. It is designed to reimburse the utility for its demand costs, "those which are
imposed upon the utility by the capacity—in terms of plant, equipment, and personnel
—which it must hold in readiness to serve its customers." Barnes, The Economics of
Public Utility Regulation 325 (1942).
11 Energy charges are determined by the total amount of energy used by the
customer. They are designed to reimburse the utility for its output costs, "those which
are a function of the volume of production and sale. These are the costs which relate
to the utilization of the existing capacity rather than to the amount of the capacity itself."
Barnes, op. cit. supra note 10, at 331. A third type of cost, customer costs (". . . those
which can be directly assigned to the individual customer." Barnes, ibid.) need not con-
cern us here.
12 There were other charges which are not pertinent to the issues here. There also
was an adjustment for variations in the cost of coal, the effect of which was not brought
into the case by testimony at trial, and which can therefore be ignored.
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and energy." Ford would have had the right under the contract to use
as much energy as it wished so long as its demand never exceeded
5300 KW." Moreover, if the demand charge and energy charge for
the month did not exceed the minimum bill, Ford would have to
pay no more than $7,314. For example, during each of the months
from May through December of 1958 Ford paid only the minimum
bill, although it used from 90,000 to 540,000 KWH of energy. Thus
in those months its energy charge ranged from $284.63 to $1,707.75.
It is not possible to tell from the record exactly how much the demand
charge was in those months. But it could not have been over $5,607.25"
in the month in which the energy charge was $1,706.75. Nor could it
have exceeded $6,095' 5 in any of the months since in none of those
months did Ford have a demand in excess of its contract demand.
Ford's breach and consequent relief of Memphis from its obliga-
tion to perform thus saved Memphis considerable expense in fuel
costs alone. Even though the District Court found that Memphis was
ready, able and willing to carry out its obligations to supply electrical
power as specified in the contract, this does not alter the fact that
Memphis did not have to spend money for coal, etc.; a necessity if
Ford was using energy. Therefore, in order to put Memphis only in
the same position that performance would have done, this saving
should have been deducted from its recovery. This, however, was
not argued on appeal, and thus the Court of Appeals could only have
considered the point on its own.
Even apart from proper judicial reluctance to consider unargued
questions, it would have been difficult on the record for the court to
apply the "savings of expense" doctrine (or for counsel to argue it).
While plaintiff would hardly complain if the court considered all the
unpaid demand charge to represent a loss, it might properly complain
if, on the record before it, the court had held that Ford's breach saved
Memphis the full amount of the energy charge (which charge, as we
have seen, is generally predicated on the actual output costs). There
was nothing in the record to show that there were no fixed costs
covered by the energy charges." Nor was there any indication that
13 Memphis had no obligation to supply electricity at a rate in excess of the con-
tract demand of 5300 KW. Of course, if such a demand were made, Memphis would
naturally meet it if it had the energy readily available, which was probably generally the
case. In fact in two months, April 1957 and April 1958, Ford did have loads in excess of
5300 KW.
14 The record, Appellant's Appendix, 36a, is not altogether clear on this point. It
shows a demand during each of the months from May through December 1958 of 5300
KW. But this must mean the contract limit on demand rather than Ford's actual demand,
since in May the energy charge plus a demand charge for 5300 KW would have ex-
ceeded the $7,314 which Ford was billed. Therefore, $7,314 less $1,706.75, the stated
energy charge, equals $5,607.25, the maximum demand charge for this particular month.
15 [5300 KW (contract demand) X $1.00 per KW] 115% 	 $6,095.
15 One of plaintiff's witnesses testified that "the fixed charges are considerably above
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there was no profit element in the energy . charge to which Memphis
would be entitled. Certainly then the court is not to be criticized for
failure to examine this contention, but, on the other hand, the case
should not be used as authority in similar cases where the utility's
savings due to the breach are shown.
In the present case, if the energy charges had been shown not to
include any fixed costs, Ford could have argued savings to Memphis
on the following basis: Ford was entitled under the contract to use
electricity any way it wished (except for resale). It could have set
up a unit using electricity at a constant rate of about 2136 KW. This
would have caused energy usage of about 1,538,000 KWH per month.
The demand charge would have been about $2,556 per month, and
the energy charge about $4,758 per month. This argument carries
the "saving of expense" notion to an extreme. The court could, how-
ever, in a case with the facts properly established, stop short of such
an extreme position. It could deduct the saving of energy costs which
would result from Ford's using no energy rather than its using an
amount at a peak demand more reasonably anticipated at the time
of the contract. If the court accepted the argument in principle,
and if in fact none of the energy charges represented fixed costs or
profits, Ford would have been entitled to deduct at least $1,219
from the minimum monthly bills of $7,314, since the parties con-
templated that the peak demand would not exceed 5300 KW and
hence that the demand charge would not exceed $6,095 per month.
One caveat should perhaps be added since the contract in Memphis
provided for a minimum charge designed to cover more than fixed
costs. Where, however, the minimum bill is $X per KW of demand
and all energy consumed is to be paid for in addition to the minimum
bill, the utility should not suffer the reduction on breach which is
suggested here. At least, it should not suffer such reduction in the
absence of a clear showing by defendant that its breach saved the
utility some expense.
Present valuation. The second failure (again ignoring the accelera-
tion clause) to put plaintiff only in the position it would have been in
if the contract had been performed involves the fact that Memphis
would have received payment of its minimum bills only in installments,
and not in a lump sum, as it demanded in this case. 17 The Court of
Appeals disposed of this problem in the following short paragraph:
production charges. In our case, they are almost double." Appellant's Appendix, 60a.
This probably referred to system wide costs, and is not very informative on the point
involved here. Fixed costs are often covered in energy charges to many domestic users
of electricity who pay on the basis of the number of KWH used without a separate
demand charge.
17 Ford did not make the "present value" argument on appeal in the manner re-
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Under the doctrine of anticipatory breach, upon the default
of Ford, this total amount became due prior to the filing of
the suit; and the district court was not in error in holding
that the City of Memphis was entitled to recover all amounts
due for minimum bills for the remainder of the contract
term.' s
This conclusion of the court confuses the right of a party to sue im-
mediately for all that is or will be due him upon an anticipatory breach,
with the valuation of that right. In short, if the purpose of the court
is to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in if the
contract had been performed, the court cannot ignore the fact that
money paid today is worth more than money paid a year from now.
If the court gives the plaintiff more than the present value of the pay-
ments due in the future, it is placing plaintiff in a better position than
he would have found himself had the contract been performed. There
is abundant authority for requiring the present valuing of plaintiff's
recovery in cases such as this one." While it is unfortunate that the
Court of Appeals leaves to posterity the language quoted above, the
result in the case belies the language. The decision does not in fact
allow Memphis to recover even the full amount of the unpaid install-
ments effective as of the time of the breach. The District Court had
allowed interest only since the filing of the complaint on August 19,
1960, S10,296.83.' Had an effort been made to transmute the pay-
ments into their present value at the time of judgment' the net
18 304 F.2d at 853.
19
 4 Corbin, Contracts §§ 965-66 (1951) ; McCormick, Damages § 144 (1935).
20
 This limited allowance is probably not in accordance with Tennessee practice.
In Brady v. Oliver, 125 Tenn. 595, 147 S.W. 1135 (1911), the court refused to allow
interest in an action for breach of contract from the date of breach, and instead allowed
it from the time of the bill. But the damages were not liquidated. In such a case the
Tennessee Court of Appeals has allowed interest from the date performance was due,
City of Lawrenceburg v. Maryland Casualty Co., 16 Tenn. App. 238, 64 S.W.2d 69 (1933).
Even if it were held that demand was required to start interest running, as was held
in a case on an implied in law contract, Robertsen v. Inglewood, 174 Tenn. 92, 123
S.W.2d 1090 (1939), Memphis did make such demand in February 1959. Of course, the
argument in the text accompanying note 10 et, seq., supra, if accepted would make the
claim of Memphis unliquidated. But the way both the District Court and the Court
of Appeals handled the case the claim was a liquidated one. Until judgment, interest
would be determined in accordance with Tennessee law in this diversity of citizenship
case. Massachusetts Benevolent Ass'n v. Miles, 137 U.S. 689 (1891), cited with approval
in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941); Hobart v. O'Brien,
243 F.2d 735 (1st Cir. 1957); Midstates Oil Corp. v. Waller, 207 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.
1953); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Soileau, 167 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1948) ; see T. & M.
Trans. Co. v. S. W. Shattuck Chem. Co., 158 F.2d 909 (10th Cir. 1947).
1! 1 Since the judgment starts drawing interest immediately, 62 Stat. 957 (1948), 28
U.S.C. § 1961 (1958), the judgment is the time at which the present valuation should
take place. 4 Corbin, Contracts § 965 (1951). It is, however, perfectly consistent with
the purpose of putting plaintiff in the same position as performance to use some earlier
time, provided further interest on the amount then calculated is allowed from that time
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increase would have been $11,707.27." The record thus shows that
the language above was in effect a somewhat ambiguous dictum incon-
sistent with the actual results of the case.
Acceleration clause. The opinion of the Court of Appeals does not
contain the acceleration clause" which Ford attacked as constituting
a penalty. Thus it appears that the clause attacked as a penalty
is the minimum bill provision. This greatly eased the court's route to
the result it reached since it could easily justify the minimum bill pro-
vision as being a proper liquidation of damages. Also it is much easier
to ignore the problems of present valuation and of savings of expenses
by breach, discussed above, if one firmly fixes in one's mind that the
minimum bill provision is designed for the post-breach situation. The
only trouble with this is that it totally ignores the facts of the case.
The minimum bill provision was a part of the operating relationship
of the parties," looking not toward breach, but toward performance."
If the same rate and method of calculation are used throughout, the result will be the
same save for the effect of compounding.
22 The legal rate of interest in Tennessee is 6%, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-1604 (1956).
Applying that legal rate and adding it to installments overdue at the time of judgment
(April 26, 1961, approximately 26%2 months after the first unpaid installment was due)
and subtracting it from installments not yet due at the time of judgment, Memphis
was entitled to a judgment of $252,576.78 plus a net increase due to interest of $11,707.27.
These calculations were made by simple interest. While compounding would he more
accurate, there is relatively little difference over the time involved. And, of course, com-
pounding always raises serious legal questions. McCormick, Damages § 53 (1935). The
figures, of course, show the wisdom of Ford's not directly raising this point in its appeal.
Professor McCormick suggests that the legal rate is inappropriate for these purposes,
and that computation should be "on the basis of the net yield, duly compounded, of
investments available to plaintiff at a minimum of risk." Id. § 144 (1935). His sug-
gestion is an excellent one, but involves certain legal difficulties which are illustrated
by the Memphis case. Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-1608 (1956) Memphis was entitled
to interest at the legal rate on the overdue installments. If it is also permitted under
Professor McCormick's view to discount future installments at an effective lower rate
of interest, Memphis gets the best of two worlds. This problem is not insuperable. A
court could perhaps dodge the interest statute as to the overdue installments by hold-
ing that, since plaintiff was bringing a suit for breach of the whole contract, not for
installments due, the question is one of damages to which the interest statute is in-
applicable. See also Note, Present Worth of Future Damages, .5 So. Cal. L. Rev. 330
(1932). Both.the question of the rate of interest and of compounding illustrate the failure
of the law to be very sophisticated about the value of the use of money (or other
property) during a period of time. See, e.g., Comment, Interest as Damages in Cali-
fornia, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 262 (1958); and sec generally, McCormick, Damages §§ 50-59
(1935). See also Gregorius v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Co., 31 U.S.L. Week 2369 (Pa.
1963); Note, Prejudgment Interest as Damages: New Application of an ,Old Theory, 15
Stan. L. Rev. 107 (1962).
23 See text between notes 4 & 5, supra.
24 It is interesting to note at this point that Memphis did not attempt' to use in
the case the following provision in the contract:
The above rates and all charges are net, the gross rate being 10% higher.
In the event the current monthly bill is not paid on or before delinquent date
shown on the bill, the gross rate shall apply.
This was a sensible bit of advocacy since the court might very well have held this a
penalty, and its whole outlook in the case might have been colored.
25 Of course, any clause es tablishing the operating relationship may be of moment
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The clause Ford alleged to be a penalty was the acceleration clause."
It is difficult to uphold the acceleration clause as a liquidated
damage clause on the basis that it liquidated Memphis' expectation.
Memphis' maximum legally enforceable expectation under the contract
was the receipt of the minimum charges at the proper time each
month. In the absence of the suggested justification below, to permit
it to accelerate such payments without reduction to present value
would be to allow it to impose a penalty for two reasons. First, the
harm from breach was very certain. 27
 Second, the amount of damages
fixed is unreasonably large in relation to either the expected or actual
harm which would flow from the breach. As pointed out previously, in
an action for damages for an anticipatory breach the amounts due the
plaintiff are to be reduced to their present value. An acceleration clause
which ignores the interest factor thus fixes unreasonably large damages
and hence is a penalty."
It can, however, be argued that Memphis has suffered an ex-
pectation loss in addition to the present value of the $7,314 due it
each month under the contract. Expectation has been used thus far
to refer to the amount to which Memphis was entitled by law under
the contract. But parties often enter contracts with expectations be-
yond the bare minimum of the other party's promises. That was cer-
tainly true of the contract in this case, where Memphis doubtlessly
hoped to," and in fact did, sell much more energy to Ford than that
covered by the minimum bills. Prior to the 1956 agreement, Ford's
monthly bills had been substantially in excess of $7,314 for many
years, and continued in the $9,000 and $10,000 range until the Spring
of 1958 when Ford began serious cutbacks at the plant. By Ford's
breach Memphis lost the hope of such sales. While Memphis could
not in the absence of a liquidated damage clause have recovered dam-
ages for the demise of such hopes, there seems to be no reason why
the parties could not bring those hopes within the scope of contract
in defining plaintiff's rights upon defendant's breach. This fact is built into the formula
which allows plaintiff to recover the monetary equivalent of performance.
20 Ford also argued that the interpretation put on the agreement by the District
Court led to harsh and unreasonable results and hence was an improper interpretation.
But this was separate from its argument concerning the acceleration clause.
27 The certainty requirement has been criticized in McCormick, Damages § 148
(1935).
28 See 5 Corbin, Contracts §§ 1065, 1072 (1951). Ford also argued that the clause
was a penalty since it applied to "any breach or default" and hence violated the "other
breaches" rule, i.e., since it applied to some breaches as to which it would be a penalty,
it was a penalty in all circumstances. For criticism of this rule, see id. § 1066 (1951)
and McCormick, Damages § 151 (1935).
28 Both the President of the Division, Appellant's Appendix 58a, and a witness
from TVA, Appellee's Appendix 106 - 12h, indicated that the minimum charges shifted
only some of the risks of non-use of capacity to the customer.
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protection through a reasonable liquidated damage provision." Just
such a provision existed here since the amount of gain to Memphis
through the application of the acceleration clause was not unreason-
ably large in relation to the loss of the unpromised but hoped for
gains.
It might further be argued that the clause was valid as a reason-
able liquidation of the investment and construction costs which
Memphis expected to incur in reliance on the contract. 31 The Presi-
dent of the Division testified that the annual fixed charges for the
generating and transmission capacity necessary to meet Ford's demand
of 5300 KW were $140,000. 32
 Such an argument is not too far afield
30
 Support for this argument is found in legions of cases which have allowed a
reasonable liquidation of damages where, for reasons of difficulty of proof, no legal
protection of the expectancy in the form of damages would otherwise be available, e.g.,
covenants not to compete in business. See 5 Corbin, Contracts 1071 (1951). If we
take Holmes' "bad man" approach those cases in the eyes of the law involve exactly
the same issue as the hoped for but unpromised expectation, since the law will effectuate
neither (at least in those cases where specific performance is unavailable).
31
 The District Court made the following finding of fact, Appellant's Appendix, 92a:
In determining the size of the generating station and the related financial re-
quirements, the Division gave specific consideration to the contracted power
requirements of each of its major industrial customers, including Ford, which
was one of the nine largest customers on plaintiff's system. It is impossible to
determine whether plaintiff would have been able to reduce the size of the
generating plant and the corresponding investment had it known that Ford
would abandon its operations in Memphis, but Ford's load was sufficiently
large so that it could have affected the size of the generating units and the
amount of investment required therefor.
32
 Appellant's Appendix, 49a-50a. This rather astounding testimony apparently
went unchallenged on cross-examination. It was evidently accepted by the District Court
in its findings of fact, Appellant's Appendix, 92a. For the purpose of commenting on
the legal rules emanating from the case, therefore, the figures must, of course, be accepted
as accurate. Nevertheless, the fact that at no time had the total charges for both
demand and energy paid by Ford ever reached $140,000 per year causes one to question
the testimony. The figure was reached by the following route: the transmission and
generating capacity cost Memphis about $200 per KW. To meet a demand of 5300 KW
it is necessary to have about 7000 KW generating capacity, the difference being for
necessary reserves and for capacity for use of energy by the utility itself. The annual
fixed charges run about ten per cent. Thus $200 x 7000 KW X 10% = $140,000.
Such testimony introduces a brand new method of electric rate fixing which should
bring delight to all utilities. In computing a unit fixed cost per KW to be charged each
customer the utility divides the total customer fixed costs (which under this method
are based on contract demands) by the actual capacity. This unit cost would then be
charged each customer for each KW of his contract demand. But since the utility knows
that it will not have to meet all the contract demands of its customers at the same
time, it builds a good deal less capacity than the total of those contract demands. With
unit fixed cost being predicated on contract demand, the effect of the utility operating
at less than total contract demand results in a reimbursement for costs which the utility
is not incurring. It would be amusing to see the cross-examination if a witness made this
suggestion in a rate proceeding before a regulatory agency.
The testimony, however, might possibly have been justified by the Peak Responsi-
bility method of allocating total system demand costs among customers. Under this
method, however, it was proper to attribute the whole 7000 KW to Ford only if Ford's
demand for 5300 KW came or was expected to come at the time the Division was sub-
ject to peak demand of all customers. Otherwise Ford's share of total system demand costs
339
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from what the Court of Appeals seems to be doing with the minimum
bill provision (not the acceleration clause, which the court ignores)
when referring to Memphis' change of position in reliance on the
contract:
The large expenditures aggregating more than $163,-
000,000 incurred by the City in order to supply the con-
tractual requirements of Ford, and other users of electric
power, make the damages in this case uncertain in amount
and difficult of ascertainment. Ford is not being penalized
by being held liable for the payments it agreed to make, even
though it does not take the electricity, which it agreed to
purchase. The large sums of money, representing the accumu-
lated minimum monthly bills for which Ford was indebted,
according to the holding of the court, are attributable to the
great amount of money invested by the City of Memphis in
planning and building for Ford's needs, and in reliance upon
Ford's agreement to purchase electricity at the specified rate
over a five year period."
The question then is, can the parties provide that the reliance interest
will be more fully protected after a breach than it would be by per-
formance? At first blush the answer would seem to be "yes." After
all, the reliance interest is one of the key interests to be protected
by the law of contract. Nor can the argument be refuted by merely
noting that, absent the clause, reliance damages could not be re-
covered without reduction by the loss which the plaintiff would have
had if there had been performance." It is precisely here, where the law
gives inadequate protection to appropriate contract interests, that
agreed damage clauses are enforced. 35 But first impressions are some-
was only the percentage of those costs which Ford contributed to the system wide peak.
Thus, if the total system peak was, say 600,000 KW, and Ford's demand at that time
was 3000 KW, its share of demand costs would be 5% of the total demand costs of the
system. Using the President's figure, annual total system demand costs were $1,500,000
to $1,600,000, and Ford's share in the hypothetical situation under the Peak Responsi-
bility method would have been $75,000 to $80,000 annually. The Peak Responsibility
method and other more sophisticated and widely used methods are described in Barnes,
The Economics of Public Utility Regulation 327-31 (1942) and Caywood, Electric
Utility Rate Economics 156-72 (1956).
33 304 F.2d at 853.
34 L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Gruber
v. S-M News Co., 126 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Stolper Steel Prod. Co. v. Behrens
Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 478, 103 N.W.2d 683 (1960); see Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v.
American Ry. Express Co., 227 Mo. App. 175, 51 S.W.2d .572 (1932) ; Restatement,
Contracts § 333(d) (1932); Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 75; 5 Corbin, Contracts
§ 1033 (1951); McCormick, Damages § 142 (1935).
The rule permitting recovery of expenditures made in reliance on the contract is
recognized in Tennessee. Brady v. Oliver, 125 Tenn. 595, 147 S.N. 1135 (1911); Allen
v. Elliott Reynolds Motor Co., 33 Tenn. App. 179, 230 S.W.2d 418 (1950).




times wrong. Any simple affirmative or negative answer should be
hedged with caution, since one cannot foresee the circumstances in
which the question may be raised. 3° Certainly, in a great many cases
the argument should be rejected in sheer disbelief of the alleged facts.
For example, if a seller delivers 100 widgets to a buyer, the price
promised being $10,000, an agreed damage clause of $12,000 should
not be upheld as a reasonable liquidation of his uncertain reliance
loss in delivering the widgets,' even though $12,000 might otherwise
be upheld as a reasonable valuation of the widgets.' The Memphis
case itself is perhaps just such a situation. One cannot compare the
annual minimum bills of $87,768 (the annual demand charge was
even less) with the testimony that annual fixed costs were $140,000
without wondering why a utility would enter such a disastrously losing
contract. One may be forgiven for simply refusing to believe that it did.
Acceptance of plaintiff's argument in such a case would tend to cut
down flexibility and cooperation in contract relations, since it would
pay the beneficiaries of such clauses to be as rigid as possible in their
demands in the hope that the other party would breach. 39 Moreover,
it is difficult to see how refusal to uphold the plaintiff's argument in
the foregoing hypothetical situation would inhibit reliance on contracts
in the future. Since the beneficiary of the clause is willing to rely on
the performance, which is definite in amount, his only reliance on the
clause would be on the gamble of non-performance. Where this ele-
ment becomes substantial the contract becomes an alternative one and
we are no longer concerned with an agreed remedy clause." Thus
more reflection suggests that clauses which do not meet the tests of
reasonableness and uncertainty of damages as applied to expectation
losses are not an appropriate protection of the reliance interest.
Where a party has a bona fide desire that his reliance losses in
as Traditional structuring of indices and digests does not make possible a thorough
search for cases or other authorities which may have advanced this point without read-
ing substantially everything written on liquidated damages. 1 have not undertaken this
forbidding task. The research which has been done in preparation of this comment,
and other work, has, however, revealed no such case or authority.
37 This example illustrates that the same problem arises if the innocent party tries
to justify an agreed damage clause on the ground that it is a reasonable liquidation of
the amount of the breacher's unjust enrichment.
38 Of course, the additional $2,000 might be upheld on other grounds, namely that
the breach caused additional losses, such as court costs, attorneys fees, etc.
:ID A similar possibility flowing from a right to restitution of benefits in excess of
the expectancy has not prevented the effectuation of such a right in the courts. See
generally, Palmer, The Contract Price as a Limit on Restitution for Defendant's Breach,
20 Ohio St. L.J. 264 (1959). But the right to restitution in excess of the expectancy in-
volves risks of valuation not likely to be present in the liquidated damage cases which
are being considered here. Thus one party can not usually be sure that it would really
benefit him if the other party breaches. This is especially true in view of the availability
of the contract price as evidence of value for restitution. See Palmer, id. at 271.
40 See 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1070 (1951).
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event of breach be reimbursed through a liquidated damage clause,
which could not be upheld by the traditional references to the legally
enforceable expectation loss, it seems very likely that the legally
enforceable expectation was not all that he hoped for under the con-
tract. It has already been suggested that such hopes might properly
be protected by a liquidated damage clause." Certainly the occurrence
of large reliance losses should reinforce any such claim.
41 See text accompanying notes 29 & 3% supra.
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